NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES

DIVISION OF RESEARCH PROGRAMS

Narrative Section of a Successful Application

The attached document contains the grant narrative of a previously funded grant application, which conforms to a past set of grant guidelines. It is not intended to serve as a model, but to give you a sense of how a successful application may be crafted. Every successful application is different, and each applicant is urged to prepare a proposal that reflects its unique project and aspirations. Prospective applicants should consult the application guidelines for instructions. Applicants are also strongly encouraged to consult with the NEH Division of Research Programs staff well before a grant deadline.

Note: The attachment only contains the grant narrative, not the entire funded application. In addition, certain portions may have been redacted to protect the privacy interests of an individual and/or to protect confidential commercial and financial information and/or to protect copyrighted materials.

Project Title:	Beyond Versailles: Reverberations of the "1919 Moment" in Asia
Institution:	Goucher College
Project Director:	Evan Dawley
Grant Program:	Collaborative Research

1. Statement of Significance and Impact

We request funding to support a key stage of collaborative historical research into the events and implications of the year 1919 for states and peoples across Northeast Asia. This project combines new empirical research and alternative approaches to a transformative moment. Historians often discuss 1919 as a year that saw the end of the old imperial world order, a time of contesting ideological visions, and the beginning of a shift in the global center of gravity westward across the Atlantic Ocean. Our starting premise is that the dominant narrative fails to address the ways in which Northeast Asians helped shape the inter-war world and defined their own realities within that context. From this point of departure, our new archival and other research demonstrates that the diplomatic and military endeavors, intellectual pursuits, and nation-building efforts of individuals and groups within Northeast Asia both engaged and contested the dominant picture of European-American hegemony. We arrive at the conclusion that Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, and Mongolians challenged that hegemony in varying ways and wrought fissures within the new world order that sharply emerged after World War II in post-colonial Asia and the multipolar world of the late 20th century.

We ask a broad question: How did Northeast Asians shape their own realities, and the global situation, in the aftermath of the Great War? We view the pivotal years around 1919 through the lenses of diplomacy, nation-building, social and cultural change, intellectual discourse, and military institutions. In so doing, we derive multiple answers to our question through analytical discoveries that explain how and why the peoples and states of Northeast Asia both attempted to shape the emerging order and pursue alternatives to it. We also make the larger point that any study of 1919 that ignores Northeast Asia—and there are many that do—is inherently incomplete. Our project will conclude around the centenary of the June signing of the Treaty of Versailles, an anniversary that highlights the need for a reinterpretation of that moment, with an edited volume titled *Beyond Versailles: Reverberations of the "1919 Moment" in Asia*, that is under contract with Lexington Books and a public symposium that will be held in Tokyo, and shortly thereafter a published essay that synthesizes our findings for a larger audience.

4. Narrative

Substance and Context

The mainstream historiography of the 20th century generally interprets 1919 as a year of great significance within a pivotal decade for the periodization of modern history. It was the year of the Treaty of Versailles that formally ended what was, to that date, the most destructive conflict in human history. The Treaty enshrined aspects of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points while it established his crowning vision of international order, the League of Nations, as the world's first formal institution of global governance. Diplomatic and popular debates over Wilson's ideas on national self-determination, collective security, and the multi-state management of international problems altered the institutional and ideological underpinnings of the empires that divided the globe. The year 1919 also demarcated a shift in the locus of international power from the Eastern to the Western shores of the Atlantic Ocean. Generally omitted from this narrative are Japan's considerable efforts to shape the post-war international system, the voices of Asian nationalists and transnationalists who found new validation for their struggles in some of Wilson's pronouncements, and the objections that Asians raised to Euro-American dominance that would shape international and transnational movements from that point onward.

The current project is among the first attempts to address these gaps in the scholarship through multi-archival, multi-national, and multi-perspective research. To be sure, historians of Northeast Asian states have already devoted significant attention to events of international significance that occurred around this time. Scholars of Japanese history, including several contributors to our endeavor, have examined either Japan's involvement in the Siberian Intervention to suppress the Bolshevik revolution (Morley 1957, White 1950), or major shifts in Japanese foreign policy and in particular its relations with the United States (Dickinson 1999 and 2013, Kawamura 2000). Contributors to a recent volume, edited by this project's Director, Co-Director, and a collaborator, launched a reexamination of the historical significance of the 1910s (Minohara et al 2014), which in fact made us aware of the need to focus on 1919. The literature on China has concentrated on the complexities of the May Fourth Movement, in which short-term student activism to oppose the settlement of Versailles mixed with reformist and

revolutionary impulses that had much deeper roots in Chinese society and politics (e.g., Chow 1960, Schwarcz 1986, Dirlik 1991, Gilmartin 1995, Lanza 2010). Scholarship on Korea's history has similarly focused on the origins and effects of mass activism, in this case the anti-colonial March First Movement, with its broad-based agenda of achieving national independence (Lee 1963, Ku 1985, Wells 1989, Podoler 2005). The sum total of these publications has told us a considerable amount about events within each country, colony, or semi-colony, but with very few exceptions (Manela 2007, Minohara et al 2014), historians have not connected these Northeast Asian histories to the broader realms of international and world history.

Our collaborative project develops that global view by connecting 12 scholars from academic institutions in the United States, Japan, China, Korea, and Germany to explore common questions through the lenses of their own research. These questions are straightforward, but invite deep relational and comparative analysis: *How did Northeast Asians experience 1919? How did Japanese, Chinese, Korean, or Mongolian states and/or people shape the regional and/or global contexts of the interwar period? To what extent did the events of 1919 serve as a temporal boundary between historical periods, and to what extent were they parts of longer-term processes?* The project members approach these questions from several geographic, methodological, and interpretive perspectives. In doing so, they both reinterpret the meanings of the "1919 moment" and suggest avenues for future research. The various contributions are outlined in detail below.

The new research undertaken by our collaborators is firmly rooted in the existing scholarship on the international history of the end of the Great War. Numerous scholars have made the year 1919 a subject of intensive scrutiny, with particular attention to the diplomatic processes that shaped the post-Great War world. Others, following in the wake of the pioneering work of Akira Iriye (Iriye 1965), have examined the grand transition from the imperialistic "old diplomacy" to the more liberal idealist "new diplomacy" that had its roots in 1919. In addition, historians have studied the fierce ideological and political debates that took place between Leninist and Wilsonian internationalism and the rise of nationalistic movements among peoples under the sway of colonial rule.

The literature on the Western experience of 1919 is extensive and well established, thus a detailed survey is neither necessary nor feasible here, beyond a brief examination of a few representative works. Woodrow Wilson, the chief protagonist of the "new diplomacy" and architect of the League of Nations and the Versailles Treaty, has been a central figure in much existing scholarship. The insightful work of Thomas Knock and John Cooper has illuminated Wilson's ideology, complex character, and influence on the world between the wars (Knock 1992, Cooper 2001). Knock and Cooper show that, although Wilson helped to forge a new set of standards for the conduct of nations in the arena of international relations, he also continued the practice of gunboat diplomacy by sending troops to Latin America more times than any of his predecessors, and enforced racially discriminatory federal policies at home that seemed out of step with the idealism of his 14 Points.

Other scholars have taken a more expansive view of the diplomatic end to the Great War. For example, Margaret MacMillan's comprehensive study of the negotiations in Paris leading up to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles provides both a detailed picture of the negotiators and confirms the Treaty's global significance while largely exonerating it from the charge that it almost ensured World War II (MacMillan 2002). A more recent work by Norman Graebner and Edward Bennett also focuses on the ideas and actions of American, British, and French diplomats, although in contrast to MacMillan, they argue that the world order envisioned by these diplomats was in fact to blame for the cataclysm that followed two decades later (Graebner and Bennett 2011). Erez Manela explores Wilson's vision in his nuanced study of the global reach of the "Wilsonian moment," as he examines the ways in which Chinese, Koreans, Egyptians, and Indians all seized on the promise of self-determination and launched anti-colonial movements for gaining national independence (Manela 2007).

In these and other books, historians present 1919 as a moment in which a few European and North American states—principally, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States—reconfirmed their supremacy over affairs in all reaches of the globe. These remaining so-called Great Powers were not omnipotent, as witnessed by their failed attempt to reverse the course of the Russian Revolution, but they asserted their primacy by excluding the newly-formed Soviet Union from the League of Nations,

devaluing Japan's voice at the Versailles talks, and ultimately refusing to dismantle the remaining colonial empires. Within this view of 1919, the centrality of Wilson suggests that it was the year that the United States attained global preeminence at the expense of the European powers that had dominated the world stage for well over a century. In short, scholars have primarily highlighted the ongoing hegemony of certain states even while affirming the end of the "long 19th century".

Our project, in a final volume of essays that will be published by Lexington Books, embraces the view that the "1919 moment"—conceived to extend before and after that calendar year—was a time of tremendous global significance. However, we also contest directly the prevailing historiographical tendency that privileges the experiences and actions of Europeans and Americans in determining the worldwide importance of that moment. We contend that the dominant narrative fails to address the populations and real or imagined states of Northeast Asia. In so doing, we also demonstrate that the diplomatic and military endeavors, intellectual pursuits, and nation-building efforts within Northeast Asia constituted a significant and new challenge to European and American hegemony. We do not intend to argue that Europeans and Americans ceased to shape the international system to suit their own interests, as that argument would necessitate the denial of historical reality. Rather, we will show that Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, and Mongolians rejected key aspects of Euro-American hegemony and raised certain challenges to the nation-state system on which it rested. They wrought fissures within the world order that exploded in the 1930s and 1940s, created conflict and instability through the Cold War, and shaped the multipolar nature of world affairs from the late 20th century.

From the perspective of Northeast Asians, 1919 marked a clear point of transition for the modern world. Undeniably, the greatest challenger to the Eurocentric system was Japan, as it ascended to the position of a Big Five Power at the Paris Peace Conference. When the Covenant of the League of Nations, part of the Treaty of Versailles, came into effect in 1920, Japan became one of only four members of the Executive Council that oversaw the League's operations. However, as a non-white country, Japan collided with a glass ceiling that relegated it to a secondary status among the Powers. Discourses of biologically-determined racial hierarchies and civilizing missions that prevailed during the "age of empire"

(Hobsbawm 1989) prevented Japan from attaining full parity with the other Great Powers. Nonetheless, these same discursive trends meant that, when Japan proposed adding a racial equality clause to the League's convention, its effort gained widespread attention around the globe, especially in what we might now term the Global South. This proposal challenged the ideological underpinnings of the remaining globe-spanning empires, which quashed the attempt.

The European and American refusal to enshrine racial equality in a multilateral treaty pushed many Japanese intellectuals and political leaders on their own rejectionist path, away from the West and toward an anti-Western form of pan-Asianism (Aydin 2007). It was no coincidence that intellectuals in Japan began to call for Japan's exit from the West and reentry to Asia, or that pan-Asianism and other transnational ideologies gained popularity, at this juncture. The "1919 moment" was a key turning point in this journey, because the lack of support from the United States became a critical catalyst for Japan's eventual departure from the established world order. Deciding that the Western Powers envisioned a world in which the white race was assured permanent supremacy, Japanese leaders began to seek an alternate course whereby Japan would become the master of Asia.

Koreans and Chinese also leveled substantive challenges to the foundation of the Euro-American international system during 1919, although they did so initially in the form of anti-Japanese mass movements. Without minimizing Korean agency, we acknowledge that a Japanese presence, especially after the imposition of a protectorate (1905) and full annexation (1910), mediated Korea's contacts with the wider world to a large degree. As a result, Japan stood in as a proxy for the international order of colonial empires. Thus, we suggest, the widespread explosion of independence-oriented mass nationalism in the March First Movement challenged not just Japanese imperialism but the broader edifice of colonial rule. Similarly, when Chinese students marched in Beijing two months later in opposition to the Treaty of Versailles, which placed Germany's concessions in China under Japanese control rather than restoring them to Chinese sovereignty, they protested the character of the "old diplomacy" with its secret agreements and presumption that the world existed for the Great Powers to divide. In both cases, Chinese and Korean activists drew on ideas and models from the very system they sought to undermine, such as

the right to national self-determination, participatory democracy, and ideas of social equality. To put it a different way, even though Japan worked to overturn aspects of Euro-American hegemony, from the perspective of many politically active Chinese and Koreans, Japan was fully complicit in the international colonial order, thus an attack on Japan's imperialist activities also targeted the larger system that had produced World War and the unequal peace.

History of the Project and Productivity

The members of this project came together to pursue individual research around shared questions in 2015. In fact, it is an outgrowth of two previous collaborative endeavors that the Director and Co-Director organized, both of which produced published volumes of essays (Kimura and Minohara 2013, Minohara et al 2014). The first project examined Japan's challenge to the international system from 1931 to 1941 using diplomatic, economic, intellectual, scientific, and cultural perspectives. The volume argued that Japan did not seek to overthrow the international system until very late in that decade because of the persistent efforts and influence of Japanese individuals and groups that held to a more cooperative vision of international relations. As the major work on that project wound down in 2008, Dr. Minohara realized that an understanding of Japan's intermittent movement towards war in 1941 required a longer historical perspective that encompassed Japan's very different role in the First World War. He invited Dr. Dawley and Dr. Tze-ki Hon, a collaborator on the present project, to join him in leading a collective inquiry into Japan's relations with the wider world during the 1910s. This project was more ambitious than the first, both in drawing scholars from North America, Asia, and Europe, and its ultimate conclusions, which challenged the long-standing view held by historians of the Great War as the primary cause of the historical changes that ended "the long 19th-century". Instead, by placing Japan at the center, the volume argued for two chronological arcs, one of which revolved around the war years, 1914-1918, and the other of which extended back to the 1880s and forward to the 1930s.

In both of these chronologies, the year 1919 held a particular significance, and so Drs. Minohara and Dawley decided to begin a third project that would enable them and a different group of scholars to

explore the nature of that year's importance for Northeast Asia. To advance that inquiry, we held an exploratory roundtable on the subject at the Association of Asian Studies (AAS) annual conference in Seattle, as well as a panel based on initial research at the European Association of Japanese Studies (EAJS) conference in Kobe, Japan, both in 2016. The collaborators in the current project are a combination of members of the earlier endeavors as well as several new scholars. Their individual contributions are discussed below, and a detailed outline of the timetable for completing the project is contained in the Work Plan, Final Product, and Dissemination section. The essays are specific to this project, although several also connect to the main research agendas of each individual. All collaborators have already published on related topics, or have relevant publications in progress, as described in their respective c.v.'s.

Collaborators and Research

The collaborators in this project address the larger questions through original individual research. We provide here summaries of each collaborator's contribution, as well as an overall description of the contribution that the project will make and the avenues it will open for further research.

Cemil Aydin, Associate Professor of History at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill and an expert on "pan-" ideologies, examines the contradictions between the accepted narrative of national self-determination and the historic reality of prominent discourses of pan-Asianism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Africanism that circulated around the world. The war's end brought more populations that practiced Islam under the rule of European empires via the mandate system, and empires in Asia and Africa remained relatively stable. He asks a key question: How can we make sense of the overlapping trajectories of imperial self-strengthening, pan-nationalism, socialist internationalism, and Wilsonianism amidst the chaotic international space of the post-war period? He answers that question by analyzing the historic creation of regional networks and geopolitical discourses. In his view, the globalization of modern international norms of sovereignty, national self-determination and human rights in Asia and

Africa depended upon the mediation of pan-nationalist activism, rather than on the European-dominated League of Nations.

Evan Dawley, Assistant Professor of History at Goucher College and an expert on Taiwan's history, explores the process of Chinese nation-state construction from a new perspective: the manner in which China-bound Chinese used Overseas Chinese to enhance China's domestic cohesion and sovereignty within the international system. This period, the May Fourth era, is well known for its multi-faceted, anti-imperialist movement that promoted cultural and social reform and national construction. However, it has generally been examined only from a domestic perspective, rather than within the international context that made national identity meaningful and important. To place the era in such a framework, Dawley looks at three instances between 1918 and 1924 in which Overseas Chinese gained significance in China-Japan relations. Building upon recent scholarship that has highlighted the importance of the war years in China's quest for international equality, and of the early 20th century for the development of strong bonds between Chinese overseas and the emerging Chinese nation-state, his original research in the archives of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs shows that Overseas Chinese became central to the nation-building efforts of China's government. Moreover, in contrast to the general image of the extreme weakness of that regime, he demonstrates that it established an important foundation in nation-building through the diaspora that its successor was able to build upon.

Frederick Dickinson, Professor of History at the University of Pennsylvania and a renowned scholar of Japanese foreign relations, challenges the current narrative of World War I in East Asia as a mere prelude to the subsequent catastrophe in the Pacific. Following similar trends in the history of modern Europe, he highlights the transformative effects of the Great War in Japan. He sees 1919 as a point of departure for Japan as a major world power and central participant in the multilateral Versailles and Washington systems. He begins with the wartime increase of naval power, arms, ammunition, shipping, and capital that catapulted Japan to the rank of world power. Subsequently, as one of the five Great Powers charged with the most pressing global concern of the day—securing peace in Paris—Japanese officials and citizens embarked upon a decade of national and global reconstruction befitting

Japan's new status. In contrast to Euro-centric visions of world order, he argues that Japan was a critical pillar of the interwar peace, and that it was Japan's dramatic change of course in 1931 that dealt a mortal blow to the multilateral system.

G. Clinton Godart, Lecturer in Modern Japanese History at Hokkaido University in Japan, adopts a different approach by examining the effects of 1919 on the ideologies that motivated the Japanese Army. He does so on the basis of extensive new research on the activities and ideas of some of Japan's most influential military theorists of the inter-war period, including Ishiwara Kanji, the architect of the 1931 Manchurian Incident, and a number of mid-level officers. Godart challenges the existing scholarly opinion on the Japanese Army, which has stressed an overriding concern with resources and thus the need to rapidly modernize. Instead, he argues that other factors were more significant, such as changing Japanese perceptions of China, Europe and the United States; expectations of war and peace in the context of the changing world order; new aspirations and possibilities for the spread of Japanese ideals abroad; new fears over the increased roles of public opinion and media; and, at least for Ishiwara, the millenarian aspects of Nichiren Buddhism. In Godart's original view, it was not resource concerns or power politics that set the Japanese Army on a path to upset the existing order, but rather the immediate post-war combination of extreme optimism over Japan's future and dark fears over its ability to survive a total war.

Tze-ki Hon, Professor of History at SUNY-Geneseo and at City University of Hong Kong, and an expert in modern Chinese intellectual history, studies the impact of the end of the war and its settlement on Chinese intellectuals' views of international diplomacy. Building upon the pioneering work of Xu Guoqi (Xu 2005), who argued that the unfavorable settlement of Versailles awakened Chinese intellectuals to the inequities of the global system of nation-states, Hon charts a sea change in the Chinese perception of the world through an examination of four concepts: civilization, culture, national sovereignty, and national boundaries. His new analysis of Chinese discourses around these concepts reveals a fundamental shift in Chinese worldviews, and particularly Chinese perceptions of Japan. Through new research on Chinese debates over two international events—the transfer of Qingdao from

Germany to Japan in 1919, and the return of Lüshun and Dalian to Chinese control in 1923—he demonstrates that a deep anxiety over Japan as a threat to national security, rather than a partner in promoting an East Asian modernity, took root by the early 1920s.

Noriko Kawamura, Associate Professor of History at Washington State University and a scholar of Japan's wartime diplomacy, examines 1919 as a major turning point for escalating naval competition between the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and the Washington Conference a year and a half later. In the interim, Japan's acquisition of Germany's Pacific Islands under the mandate system prompted a major shift in U.S.-Japanese relations. Kawamura asks several questions about the impact of Japan's territorial gain: How did it influence the ongoing "big navy" strategic thinking the Japanese navy had embraced since 1907? How did it alarm the U.S. navy? How did the U.S. reaction in turn alarm the Japanese navy? To answer these questions, she reexamines the opposing naval strategies of Admiral Katō Tomosaburō and Vice Admiral Katō Kanji. The former, who recognized the constraints on Japan's industrial capacity, opted for conciliatory relations with the United States in favor of a naval limitation agreement, while the latter, who believed in an inevitable war with the United States, insisted on a "big navy" strategy. Kawamura argues that the strategic debates that emerged in 1919 foreshadowed the course of Japan's military expansion in the 1930s and 1940s.

Junghoon Lee, Associate Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Ulsan in Korea, sees the events of 1919 as pivotal for influencing Korean intellectuals to favor a republic rather than a constitutional monarchy as they imagined an independent nation. His research indicates that, prior to 1919, most Korean intellectuals and political leaders envisioned a constitutional monarchy for the modern Korean state because they were influenced by the structure created under Japan's Meiji Constitution. At the turn of the century, leading Korean reformers had looked to Japan for models and direct guidance, but in 1919 and after, a number of developments prompted a shift in Korean thinking. In reframing the explosion of Korean nationalism, Lee explores the experience of exile in the Republic of China, where many Koreans fled in the wake of the suppression of the March First Movement; the foundation of the Weimar Republic in 1919 as the successor state to the German monarchy; and the subsequent republican

constitutions in Austria, Poland, and Turkey. However, in taking a long view of the effects of 1919, he emphasizes an apparent contradiction between the growing interest in political models beyond the confines of the Meiji Constitution and the persistence of elements of Japanese influence in the Korean judicial system and legal practice well after independence was achieved.

Tatiana Linkhoeva, a post-graduate fellow at Ludwig-Maximillians University in Munich and a scholar of Japan, Russia, and Mongolia, examines the under-studied subject of pan-Mongolist ideology. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, Buryat nationalists proposed the creation of a Mongolian Republic that would unite all Mongolian groups: minorities within the Russian Empire such as Buryats, Tuvans, and Kalmyks; and those who were under Chinese control, like the Mongols from Outer and Inner Mongolia. Linkhoeva focuses on the years between 1917 and 1922, which encompassed the Russian Civil War and the Japanese occupation of Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East, a time of instability when it seemed to the Buryat nationalists that their irredentist plans were realizable. She argues that, in order to achieve that goal in a context defined by competing Soviet, Japanese, and Chinese interests, the Buryat nationalists promoted a pan-Mongolian identity in order to build an expansive Mongolian state. Moreover, in the face of the Japanese Army and its pan-Asian slogans, the Buryat nationalists threw in their lot with the Comintern, a decision they would come to regret in Stalin's purges of the 1930s.

Tosh Minohara, Professor of U.S.-Japanese Relations at Kobe University and a widely published expert on Japanese and U.S. diplomatic history, studies Japan's efforts to have a clause on racial equality inserted into the Treaty of Versailles as a new phase in Japan's long-term quest for international parity. He traces this initiative back to Japan's mid-19th century attempts to revise the unequal treaties, especially in terms of its attempts to regain tariff autonomy and end extraterritoriality. However, he argues that success in those areas did not bring equality, as the so-called "immigration issue" manifested in the United States in the form of an anti-Japanese movement early in the 20th century. The persistence of such attitudes in the United States, as seen in the failure of 1913 talks on immigration, conflicted with a widely-held sense in Japan that equal treatment was an important aspect of modernization. Therefore, Japan sought to gain racial equality upon the termination of the Great War. However, as Minohara's

research in Japan's Foreign Ministry archives demonstrates, when Japan's quest was frustrated by other issues, 1919 became the moment when Japan's national pride became inextricably intertwined with the issue of racial equality.

Tadashi Nakatani, Adjunct Professor of diplomatic history at Doshisha University in Kyoto, challenges the conventional view that Hara Takashi (Kei), Japan's Prime Minister from 1918-1921 and the initiator of party-led cabinets, was the architect of significant changes in Japan's domestic and foreign policies. Hara's tenure has generally been understood as the starting point of a more cooperative diplomacy that became, perhaps because of his assassination in 1921, a road not taken. Using new research in Japan's diplomatic archives, Nakatani affirms that Hara consolidated power under his leadership as Prime Minister, and protected the voice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in making foreign policy, but he disputes the notion that Hara charted a new diplomatic course. He argues, instead, that younger diplomats shaped Japanese policies at the Paris Peace Conference and set in motion a generational shift in foreign policy. However, he concludes that that change never became institutionalized because of the ongoing influence over foreign affairs by other branches of the state.

Chunling Peng, Associate Professor of History at the Institute of Modern History in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, seeks to shed new light on the May Fourth and New Culture Movements, popular efforts for political and cultural reform that shaped China's subsequent history, by examining the factional disputes among Chinese intellectuals. At the core of her study is Kang Youwei, an ardent Confucian and a leader of China's reformists since the 1890s, who came under attack from all parts of the intellectual spectrum beginning in 1919. Peng concentrates on two main debates: the issues vs. isms dispute between Hu Shi, a leader of the liberal faction, and Li Dazhao, a well-known leftist; and the conflict over Western and Eastern culture that involved Hu and Liang Shuming, an advocate of New Confucianism. Through her extensive reading of published materials from that era, Peng argues that the ways in which May Fourth intellectuals positioned themselves and their opponents in relation to Kang indicates the persistence of late imperial Chinese Confucianism within the modern Chinese nation-state, and thus the limits of May Fourth era reforms.

Torsten Weber, Senior Research Fellow at the German Institute for Japanese Studies in Tokyo and a scholar of Japanese intellectual history, offers a new interpretation of Asianism in Japan. He addresses the emergence of a new Asianist global consciousness following the end of the First World War that was linked to perceptions that East Asia was under threat. The marked spread of affirmative attitudes towards Asia resulted from frustrations with the failure of the Japanese government to negotiate a less Western-centric world order, and a boom in internationalist thought and activism following the creation of the League of Nations and other internationalist organisations and movements in the early 1920s. In this political climate, Asianist thinkers and activists in Japan succeeded in popularizing their ideas for the erection of an Asian union or Asian league based on an assumed common task to secure no less than Asia`s survival. Based on his original survey of previously understudied individuals and groups, in both Japan and China, Weber reaches an important conclusion. He argues that, while some thinkers attempted to disguise their nationalist-chauvinist ambitions, others seemed to embrace internationalist attitudes and displayed a new global consciousness that was no longer modernist or Western-centric. Therefore, in contrast to the general view of pan-Asianism as highly nationalistic, the version that prevailed in the early 1920s should be seen as Asian worldism.

Collectively, the participants provide a tremendous depth and breadth of new empirical research to the study of the “1919 moment”. Working in archives and libraries around the globe, they have uncovered new information that allows the project to advance a revised interpretation of this period. According to our current analysis, 1919 was, indeed, a global moment that saw significant debates and transformation for the peoples and states of Northeast Asia. However, it was not a unidirectional moment, in which everything important emanated outwards from the North Atlantic. Instead, Northeast Asians brought their own interests and agendas to Versailles, derived their own conclusions about what the war and its peace meant, and subsequently moved along trajectories that challenged European and American hegemony through the pursuit of genuine national equality, the undermining of empires, and the formulation of transnational ideologies outside of Wilsonian and Leninist conceptions. It is for these reasons that we argue that scholars who seek a true understanding of the global significance of 1919

cannot continue to exclude Northeast Asia, for to do so leaves us stuck in a paradigm of untrammeled Euro-American supremacy.

Our conclusions also lead to questions that we hope will be taken up by future researchers. What prevented the seeds planted in 1919 from coming to fruition more quickly? Why did it take two decades for Japan to attempt to overthrow the international order, and why did it do so unilaterally rather than collectively? When did Asian nationalisms begin to effectively undermine the imperialist order? Why did nationalist ideologies prove more immediately attractive and powerful than pan-ist visions, even though both circulated widely in 1919 and after? What additional perspectives are needed to better understand the significance of 1919 itself? By opening a door for reexamining this era, we hope to promote further explorations that will challenge the conventional wisdom.

Methods

As stated previously, this project seeks to answer several basic questions through the methods of historical research: *How did Northeast Asians experience 1919? How did Japanese, Chinese, Korean, or Mongolian states and/or people shape the regional and/or global contexts of the interwar period? To what extent did the events of 1919 serve as a temporal boundary between historical periods, and to what extent were they parts of longer processes?* Each collaborator approaches these questions through a combination of archival and published primary sources, and by situating their analyses within broader historiographies of both 1919 and their specific national or transnational subjects. They draw materials from archives and libraries in the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, and Russia. At this time all members have completed the bulk of their research and, while additional materials are needed in some cases, are in the process of writing drafts of their essays. These drafts will be submitted in mid-2017 for initial review by the Director and Co-Director, as well as further review by other participants, after which they will be revised on the basis of comments received from project members. Since one of our planned products is an edited, peer-reviewed volume, each essay will undergo further revision after Lexington Books submits the essays for external review.

Our goals are to create a volume, *Beyond Versailles*, that is cohesive and built around common questions and themes, and to ensure that our conclusions reach as large an audience as possible. In order to achieve these objectives, we have planned two meetings of the entire group, one in January 2018 and one in June 2019. It is to support the first of these events, a conference for all contributors at the Fujitsu-JAIMS Foundation's academic campus near Honolulu, Hawai`i, that we seek NEH support. The second event will be a public symposium to launch the volume, the location of which remains to be determined. Since the symposium is not a part of this grant, it is not discussed in detail here. The first event is essential if we are to produce the strongest, most coherent volume possible, because it is the only opportunity that we will have to get all contributors together in one place to discuss all of the essays and to refine our overall conclusions. While it is possible for a few of us to meet at the annual Association of Asian Studies conference, the uncertainties of getting conference panels accepted, the sometimes inconvenient timing of that conference, and the unavailability of individual funding make it impossible to guarantee that everyone will be able to attend the same event. Director Dawley and contributors Nakatani, Peng, and Godart in particular have limited funds for conferences, and Peng needs considerable advance notice in order to obtain her travel documents from the Chinese government. Thus, we decided that a separate meeting, planned well in advance, was the only way to ensure that everyone would be able to attend. Moreover, while it is true that some of this work could be done over e-mail, our experience as editors has taught us that face-to-face interaction allows for concentrated feedback from multiple perspectives, in contrast to the diffuse nature of e-mail comments, and it is realistically the only way to get everyone to contribute to the broad conclusions of the project. Without NEH support, we will simply not be able to hold this meeting and the project will suffer as a result.

At this meeting, we will both discuss individual chapters in small groups and collectively outline the key findings of the project. Approximately one month before the meeting, we will distribute the draft versions of the papers to two groups of contributors. One will be comprised of Minohara, Dickinson, Nakatani, Kawamura, and Godart, who will address their chapters on Military and Diplomatic Affairs. The other will include Dawley, Hon, Peng, Lee, Aydin, Linkhoeva, and Weber, who will discuss their

essays on Intellectual and Trans-Border Affairs. A full breakdown of the groups, the titles of the individual chapters, and a timetable for the meeting are in Appendix 3. Each contributor will read all of the chapters in their group, and when we convene the groups will collectively discuss each chapter in detail in order to help each author both refine their arguments and improve the structure of their paper. We will then gather as a full team, the Director and Co-Director will summarize the overall themes that emerge from the contributions, and we will discuss overarching conclusions. The notes we take here will help the Director and Co-Director craft both the Introduction to the volume and a related essay for submission to an academic journal. The meeting will extend over four days, two travel days surrounding two days of meetings.

We have selected the location for a variety of reasons. Given that most of the contributors work at institutions around the Pacific Rim, Hawai`i is the most central geographic location for everyone. A location in the continental United States would involve much longer travel for most of the participants and would result in a less-productive meeting. Second, Kobe University, the home institution of Co-Director Minohara, has an office at the Fujitsu-JAIMS Hawai`i campus and so we will be able to use seminar rooms located there. The small, modern campus is in Hawai`i Kai, about 20 minutes from Honolulu, a somewhat secluded location that is conducive to academic discussion. The JAIMS program provides a unique approach to studying the Asia-Pacific region, with students rotating between four campuses in Japan, the United States, Thailand, and Singapore as they combine liberal arts studies with management theory and practical field research. While we have selected the location mostly for logistical reasons, there is a certain overlap between our project and this program's regional outlook. We will make hotel arrangements closer to the meeting, but will book rooms at a business hotel in Honolulu and will also rent three cars for transportation to and from the meeting site, hotel, and the airport.

Work Plan, Final Product, and Dissemination

We are applying for funding to cover certain aspects of the group project during 2018. This is the critical period for the completion of the project, during which the collaborators will be revising their

essays on the basis of in-group comments discussed at the contributors' conference described above. Based upon our contract with Lexington Books, we will deliver a full manuscript of 12 chapters plus an Introduction in June 2018. Prior to that time, collaborators will conduct their own research, write their contributions, and meet once as a full group. The publisher will determine the subsequent timetable, which will involve an external review, an additional round of revisions by each contributor, copy-editing, indexing, and correction of final proofs, all of which will be completed so that the book can be published by the summer of 2019. This finished volume is one way in which we will disseminate our findings.

We will make the findings of this project available to a primarily scholarly audience in two other ways. First, the Director and Co-Director will complete an essay that synthesizes the analytical findings of the project and includes a discussion of the broad global significance of those conclusions, which we will submit to an academic publication such as *The Journal of World History*. This essay should reach a larger audience of scholars and students because it will be written for use in classes on East Asian and World history. Second, we will hold a public event in June 1919 to coincide with the publication of the volume. The location is not yet determined, but we are applying for some financial support from the Shibusawa Eiichi Memorial Foundation in Tokyo and will seek additional grants to make the event possible. This Foundation, named for one of the architects of modern Japan, sponsors research projects and hosts small seminars on topics including Shibusawa Eiichi's own life, East Asian regional politics and relations, and business history. At this event, the collaborators will present the results of their research and we will engage in an open discussion of our reinterpretation of the year 1919 from Northeast Asian perspectives. We will hold the event in either Japan or the United States, in order to reach audiences that might not otherwise become aware of our project.

The specific timetable of activities for the whole project is as follows, broken into six-month blocks of time and including periods not covered by the grant:

January 1-June 30, 2017: This is a period of research and writing for all members of the project, as first drafts of the essays will be submitted to the Director and Co-Director for review on June 1. We

will begin making arrangements for the January 2018 meeting in Honolulu, pending the receipt of this grant.

July 1-December 31, 2017: Over the summer, the Director and Co-Director will divide up the essays into the two groups described above, read and comment on the essays for which they are responsible, and return the drafts to the authors by September 1. On December 1, we will distribute the draft papers to all members of the small groups to read. If we receive this grant, we will finalize arrangements for the Hawai`i conference.

January 1-June 30, 2018: All collaborators will hold their first collective meeting, a closed conference at the Fujitsu-JAIMS campus in Honolulu in early January. This meeting will include extensive commentary on all of the papers by group members, who will have read the papers in advance. Discussions at this meeting will also be held to assemble the final conclusions of the project. Following the meeting, collaborators will revise their essays and submit new drafts to the Director and Co-Director, who will send the full manuscript to Lexington Books on June 1.

July 1-December 31, 2018: Depending upon when we receive comments from our outside reviewer(s), we may complete final revisions and submit the finished chapters, or begin revisions during this period. Lexington Books has not yet given us a firm schedule. We will also work on the synthetic essay for submission to an academic journal and make arrangements for the final symposium.

January 1-June 30, 2019: All collaborators will complete final versions of their essays and review proofs, the volume will be copy-edited and an index created, and Lexington Books will prepare the manuscript for publication by the summer. The Director and Co-Director will complete work on the journal article. In June, we will hold our public symposium and launch the published volume. This event and the publication of the journal essay will mark the conclusion of this project.